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Recent developments in South Asian countries, especially the re-emergence of 
democratic governments, new growth momentum despite the global economic downturn 
and greater openness, warrant a fresh look at the region’s prospects for economic 
integration. On the basis of a thorough review of the literature on potential and prospects 
of regional integration in South Asia and after examining the trends in intra-SAARC trade 
and investment flows, this paper finds that the progress in regional cooperation has been 
far short of potential. The paper, therefore,  focuses  on the ‘real impediments’ to regional 
integration and on that basis makes a set of policy oriented recommendations for 
furthering deeper regional integration in South Asia. It also emphasizes that given its 
dominant size, human resources, and aspirations for a global role, India will have to take 
on a disproportionately larger responsibility for promoting regional cooperation in South 
Asia. However, regional integration will not be achieved by India’s unilateral actions 
alone. Neighboring governments will have to respond positively to Indian initiatives for 
successful regional integration in South Asia. 
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1.   Introduction  
 
There is perhaps no other historical example like South Asia of a geographically and 
historically contiguous region with widely shared social, cultural, linguistic  and spiritual 
practices, experiencing a continuous fragmentation of its once reasonably integrated 
economic space. Intra-regional trade in the South Asian region (broadly from Kabul to 
Chittagong) was as high as 19% in 1948, soon after the countries achieved 
independence from British rule. But this declined to a mere 2% by 1967. Intra-regional 
trade has perked up a bit in recent years but still remains below 6% of South Asia’s total 
trade with the world. This is far below levels of intra-regional trade in other regions such 
as East Asia and the Pacific (about 52%), Latin America and Caribbean (about 17%) and 
even Sub-Saharan Africa (at nearly 11%).
1 According to the World Bank (2007), only 7% 
of all telephone calls in South Asia are intra-regional as compared with 71% in East 
Asia.
2 Cross-border investment is also negligible with none being permitted between 
India and Pakistan. Informal or border trade and movement of personnel are perhaps 
larger than normal trade flows and intra-regional tourism, knowledge sharing or 
technology transfer across countries is well below its potential. Given this rather dismal 
picture of the progress of regional cooperation nearly 25 years after the formation of the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) would justify anyone in 
treating SAARC as a failed experiment. But as we argue below, this conclusion may not 
be fully justified.   
 
South Asia has the dubious distinction of having an even larger number of poor people 
living below $1 per day than sub-Saharan Africa. Border regions—where central policy 
making in any country is peripheral and where this poverty is largely concentrated—will 
benefit significantly from greater regional economic cooperation because it opens up 
these borders and converts peripheries to new poles of economic activity. Historically, 
the best example is the development of Northern Italy and Southern Switzerland. 
Greater cross border flows became possible with the opening of the Mont Blanc tunnel 
under the Alps that drastically reduced travel times and opened up the border regions on 
both sides.
3 A similar growth-generating impact can be expected in the Eastern regions 
of South Asia, where Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal are in close proximity to each 
other, through greater regional cooperation. This would make existing national borders, 
which arbitrarily divided organically integrated communities, once again irrelevant. 
However, as section 2 shows, these and other intuitive arguments in support of regional 
integration are not unambiguously endorsed by empirical studies attempting to quantify 
the benefits of regional economic cooperation in South Asia. 
  
Section 3 then re-examines the structure and direction of trade flows in South Asia and 
concludes that in a region characterized by low per capita incomes, poorly developed 
infrastructure, and high transaction costs, trade liberalization can be expected to yield 
                                                           
1  World Bank (2007, 4) Regional formations like the EU and ASEAN also have a high share of intra-
regional trade, at nearly 65% and 24% respectively. 
2  Ibid p. 4. 
3  As a complete contrast the case of the Ferghana Valley in Central Asia can be cited, where new 
borders created after 1991 resulted in massive economic dislocation and steep fall in living standards, 




only modest gains. Deeper integration that encourages cross border investment by 
improving the business environment and reducing uncertainty is perhaps a necessary 
condition for successful regional integration. This requires greater investment in regional 
public goods and expansion of productive capacities in the framework of regional 
production networks that will facilitate the growth of intra-industry trade. In this regard, 
we look at the experience of regional cooperation in East and Southeast Asia to draw 
relevant lessons for advancing the process in South Asia.  The primacy of developing 
physical infrastructure and improving connectivity to foster intra-regional trade has been 
pointed out by several authors (Muchkund Dubey 2007, Wilson and Otsuki, 2007, and 
others) but so far has been not carried forward.  
 
Section 4 therefore reviews the policy developments in the region to identify factors that 
are holding up needed investment in regional public goods, physical infrastructure, and 
intra-regional connectivity. We also review the private sector’s experience in cross 
border investment within South Asia to be able to suggest public policy measures for 
encouraging it further.   
 
Section 5 takes a forward looking stance and discusses the possible role that India can 
and should play in this regard. The two central arguments that are made in this section 
are that first, there is little value addition in proliferating regional trade and economic 
cooperation agreements as these simply confuse both the private entrepreneur and 
public authorities, and distract from efforts to strengthen existing formations. Second, 
that it is in India’s national interest to take a proactive role in promoting regional trade 
and investment integration and that India should take on the principal responsibility in 
this regard. However, regional integration will not be achieved by India acting alone, and 
other governments will have to respond positively to India’s efforts. Finally, the last 
section makes specific recommendations for the various stakeholders in the South Asia 
regional economic cooperation process.  
 
The paper makes three central arguments: first, that regional economic integration in 
South Asia that implies a greater share of intra-regional trade and cross border 
investment is not only desirable but necessary if South Asian countries are to realize 
their development objectives of reducing poverty by sustaining rapid and spatially 
equitable economic growth. Therefore, governments in the region must continue these 
cooperative efforts despite the provocations and setbacks from extremist violence or 
factional and fractious politics. Second, all South Asia countries will have to view the 
process positively and play their role in advancing the process. However, given its 
dominant size, human resources, and aspirations for a global role, India will have to take 
on a disproportionately larger responsibility and ensure that regional cooperation in 
South Asia is successful. Third, as a result of widespread and increasing civil society 
support in all South Asian countries, the process of regional cooperation could well be 
near a tipping point. A coordinated and sustained effort could push it into a virtuous cycle 
that will yield significant gains for all concerned with tangible externalities for the entire 
global community. Therefore, major countries and multilateral agencies and existing 
SAARC institutions would do well to provide the necessary impetus to push it beyond the 
tipping point and at least make it invulnerable to sudden random shocks. At present, 
however, random negative events such as a major terrorist attack can push the entire 
process backwards. Multilateral institutions and the private sector, domestic and foreign, India’s Role in South Asia Trade and Investment Integration  |       3 
 
 
can play an important role in strengthening regional cooperation and making the process 
less vulnerable to such shocks.   
 
 
2.    The Case for Trade and Investment Integration in South 
Asia  
 
Recent developments in the region, especially new growth momentum and greater 
openness in all South Asian economies, warrant a fresh look at enhancing regional 
integration. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the South Asian economies has grown 
strongly at about 6% since the 1990s, and almost 7% in the last five years, starting in 
2002–03. This higher growth trajectory is directly attributable to the opening up of the 
economies and adoption of stabilizing macroeconomic policies. Growth rates of these 
magnitudes have helped South Asia to reduce poverty rates and raise living standards. 
However, the incidence of poverty is still very high and the absolute number of people 
living below the poverty line has actually increased. The biggest challenge for the region 
is poverty reduction through robust and sustained growth.   
 
A recent growth accounting exercise for the region (Collins 2007) reveals that though 
both capital accumulation and increased efficiency of factor usage have contributed to 
higher growth in South Asia, these countries have not been characterized by high rates 
of investment, especially in comparison with East Asian economies.
4 Greater regional 
integration will help improve the investment climate in the region and encourage more 
cross border investment. Reducing poverty also requires faster growth in the 
manufacturing sector, which can absorb the labor displaced from the agriculture sector. 
The manufacturing sector in the region suffers from under utilization of technology, 
inappropriate scales, and poor infrastructure. Most of these factors will benefit from 
greater regional integration. The role of manufacturing in generating inclusive, 
employment-intensive growth has been under estimated in South Asia, perhaps because 
of the greater dynamism shown by the services sectors in all the countries in the region 
(Table 1). However, services are often a residual sector for national statistics and could 
disguise very low levels of productivity in a very large segment of this sector. 
Manufacturing has to be encouraged in South Asia and this will benefit directly from 
greater regional cooperation and integration.  
 
That regional cooperation benefits the manufacturing sector through trade expansion 
and economies of scale can be seen in the European Union (EU), Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and others. Removal of barriers to trade can 
stimulate competition which can help boost allocative and productive efficiency by 
facilitating industrial restructuring that is less difficult in the context of larger and growing 





                                                           
4  Collins (2007) ‘Economic Growth in South Asia, A Growth Accounting Perspective’ in South Asia: 




Table 1: Value Added (% GDP) 
 
Country Name   Agriculture  Industry  Manufacturing  Services   
  1990s 2000s 1990s 2000s 1990s 2000s 1990s 2000s 
Bangladesh   27.1   22.5   23.9   26.3   14.9   15.9   49.2   51.2  
Afghanistan   n.a   42.9   n.a   22.6   n.a   15.2   n.a   34.5  
Bhutan   33.8   26.7   31.8   37.5   9.6   7.8   36.4   35.8  
India   29.3   20.9   26.9   26.5   16.5   15.5   50.5   52.6  
Nepal   42.8   38.9   20.6   21.2   8.6   8.3   38.9   40.0  
Pakistan   26.1   23.6   24.4   23.6   16.4   16.4   51.2   52.8  
Sri Lanka   23.6   19.0   26.4   26.6   15.7   15.7   52.8   54.4  
 
Source: WDI.  
 
 
Table 2: Share in Total Export to the World 
 
SITC   South Asia (minus India)       SITC  South Asia with India    
84   Apparel/clothing/access   41.4    84 Apparel/clothing/access    14.4 
65   Textile yarn/fabric/art.   25.8   33  Petroleum and products   12.4 
4   Cereals/cereal preparation   4.1    65 Textile  yarn/fabric/art.    10.9 
7   Coffee/tea/cocoa/spices   3.0    66  Non-metal mineral manufactures   8.2 
33   Petroleum and products   2.7    89  Misc manufactures nes   5.1 
3   Fish/shellfish/etc.   2.6    67  Iron and steel   4.5 
89   Misc manufactures nes   2.3   51  Organic chemicals   3.5 
61   Leather manufactures   1.9   28  Metal ores/metal scrap   3.5 
66   Non-metal mineral  
manufacture   1.7 
 
68  Non-ferrous metals   2.8 
5   Vegetables and fruit   1.0   54  Pharmaceutical products   2.4 
 
Notes: Bhutan has not been included. Data for Bangladesh is for 2004, Nepal 2003, and Sri Lanka 2005. For India, 
Pakistan and Maldives data pertains to 2006.  
Source: Estimated from WITS Database. 
 
 
Because the manufacturing sector is restricted by limited capacity to generate exportable 
surpluses and lacks product diversity, the region’s share in global exports remains 
negligible at 1.3%. Exports remain concentrated in low technology products such as 
textiles and garments, leather products, and agricultural products (Table 2). A regionally 
integrated South Asia will attract globally leading firms to establish capacities within the 
region to meet demand from South Asia’s burgeoning middle class. An immediate and India’s Role in South Asia Trade and Investment Integration  |       5 
 
 
almost certain spillover effect is for these large foreign firms to use the newly created 
capacities to supply their global requirements. This will help South Asian countries to 
increase their shares in global markets, generate employment and reduce poverty. 
 
An integrated market can be especially important for small economies in South Asia by 
acting as a launching pad for integrating with extra-regional markets and providing an 
opportunity to diversify into export goods with higher value added to the sub regions. 
Greater trade between the countries also gives impetus to infrastructure development. 
The flow of information and technology and knowledge spill-over, increased foreign 
direct investments, and regulatory cooperation and harmonization can make economies 
more dynamic. Therefore, to maximize the benefits of higher growth regional cooperation 
needs to be strengthened.  
 
Intuitive arguments in support of greater regional integration are also backed up by 
quantitative exercises, a number of which are reported in the literature. Studies 
conducted for South Asia show that dismantling tariff and non tariff barriers will increase 
trade and welfare in the region. One of the earliest studies conducted, T.N.Srinivasan 
(1994), using a gravity model, showed  that a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in South Asia 
would lead to an increase in trade of 8.9 times in Bangladesh, 9.5 in Pakistan, 12.8 in 
India, 10.3 in Sri Lanka and 17.2 in Nepal. Given initial trade patterns, Nepal and 
Bangladesh stand to gain most significantly from such an arrangement. The simulation 
showed that the effect of removing all tariffs would be to increase total trade from 3% of 
GDP for India to 59% of GDP in Nepal, and something in between for the other 
countries. Hassan (2001), using a gravity model, looked at whether trade in the region 
was small because of normal outcomes or because of unexplored trade opportunities 
and found that SAARC member countries were yet to achieve trade-creating benefits. 
SAARC countries should liberalize trade as these offered significant gains for all the 
economies in the region. Further effort was needed to liberalize border trade and     
remove tariff and non-tariff barriers in the general framework of South Asian Preferential 
Trading Arrangements. Hirantha (2004) also used the gravity model to evaluate the 
progress of South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) and the prospects for 
South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) using trade data for 1996–2002. Both panel 
data and cross sectional data analysis were used. The gravity model results showed that 
there was a significant trade creation effect under SAPTA and found no evidence of 
trade diversion effect with the rest of the world. Pitigala Nihal (2005) using the natural 
trading partners hypothesis as the empirical criterion to assess the potential success of a 
South Asian trading bloc showed that South Asian countries could be characterized only 
as moderate natural trading partners. But this characterization was largely a 
consequence of previous impediments to trade among regional members. The author 
also used additional statistical measures—revealed comparative advantage indices, 
trade concentration, and trade competition profiles—and demonstrated that the trade 
structures that have evolved among the South Asian countries may not facilitate a rapid 
increase in intra-regional trade. But there was evidence that previous unilateral trade 
liberalization efforts in the South Asian countries have already had a positive impact in 
boosting both intra- and extra-regional trade. He therefore recommended continuation of 
the process of unilateral liberalization, in parallel with regional integration, to help the 
South Asian countries to continue diversifying still narrow export bases and potentially 




successful implementation of SAFTA. The most recent study, (UNCTAD and ADB 2008) 
used general equilibrium analysis to estimate the impact of SAFTA on the welfare of 
member nations. It concluded that SAFTA will be trade creating, with India serving as the 
growth pole for the region, and found that all the participating countries will gain. Gains 
will be greater for smaller, least-developed countries.  
 
Studies have also been conducted at a micro level from a one-country perspective. 
Kemal et al. (2000) found that the South Asian region was characterized by an almost 
identical pattern of comparative advantage in a relatively narrow range of products and 
that there was a lack of strong complementarity in the bilateral trade structures of South 
Asian countries .This may have played a role in constraining intra regional trade growth 
in South Asia. They also looked at the Grubel-Lloyd indices of intra-industry trade, based 
on industry-wise exports and imports of Bangladesh to and from India, Nepal, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka. According to them the low intensity of intra-industry trade in the region 
indicated the potential for widening its scope. But since intra-industry trade was largely 
driven by product differentiation and increasing returns to scale, increasing it could only 
be achieved if these countries would develop technological capacity to produce different 
product varieties at declining average cost. This also required that firms operating in 
South Asia were able to exploit economies of scale, which would be possible if the 
markets were more integrated. Batra (2004), using an augmented gravity model, 
estimated the trade potential for India with its trading partners in the world and 
specifically within regional groupings like the SAARC. Though the estimates indicated 
positive trade potential for the SAARC region as a whole, the positive trade potential was 
mainly on account of potential trade between India and Pakistan, which was estimated at 
$6.5 billion more than the actual trade between these economies.  On the basis of the 
trend and structure of trade between India and Bangladesh Rahman (2005) believes that 
bilateral trade between India and Bangladesh was not as high as it should be. And there 
was scope for mutual trade expansion. If Bangladesh’s exports were increased, this 
would induce higher imports of raw materials and intermediate goods from India. The 
demand for the Indian consumer goods exports would also increase in Bangladesh due 
to higher income from increased exports.   
 
Among those who have not been optimistic about the benefits from greater trade and 
investment integration in South Asia region are Bandara and Yu (2003).They have used 
trade data and a global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to address the 
desirability of SAFTA and perform simulations using two policy scenarios namely, 
unilateral liberalization and preferential liberalization. Results from the two scenarios 
confirm the pessimistic view by showing that unilateral liberalization would benefit South 
Asia countries much more than preferential liberalization. This is because it would be 
difficult to achieve meaningful regional cooperation in economic and social matters in the 
SAARC region without proper resolution of political conflicts between member countries, 
particularly between India and Pakistan. They therefore recommend that it would be 
better for policy makers in the region to put more effort into liberalizing their own trade 
regimes, rather than wasting energy on forming SAFTA with a lot of economic and 
political constraints. According to Panagariya (2003), trade diversion will probably 
swamp the beneficial trade creation effects. Krueger et al (2004) suggest that although 
potential gains from SAFTA exist, the region does not meet most of the theory-based 
criteria for successful trade agreements. Both Panagariya and Krueger feel that India’s Role in South Asia Trade and Investment Integration  |       7 
 
 
unilateral and bilateral liberalization may be more efficient ways to achieve welfare and 
economic improvements. According to them the welfare benefits of SAFTA could be 
significantly higher for all countries if an agreement could be forged between NAFTA and 
SAFTA and not by promoting SAFTA by itself.  
 
Kumar and Saini (2007) look at the Pareto optimality of SAFTA as well as the welfare 
optimality of alternative sets of coordinated trade policies that go beyond SAFTA using 
the standard static GTAP model. These policies include (i) extended preferential trading 
between SAFTA and three other major trading blocs (ASEAN), the North American Free 
Trade Area (NAFTA) and the EU27; (ii) coordinated full trade liberalization (carried out 
unilaterally or as part of a multilateral agreement) by South Asian countries, and (iii) 
SAFTA plus a customs union (two variants with 5% and 10% Common External Tariff). 
Their analysis shows that the welfare basis for establishing SAFTA or for deeper trade 
policy coordination in South Asia was not very strong. Nor was it obvious that 
cooperation in South Asia would be forthcoming given the rather meager anticipated 
welfare impacts.   
    
Though there have been hardly any studies into the impact of an FTA on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the South Asian region due to lack of data on bilateral FDI,   
Jayasuriya and Weekrakoon (2002) looked at the nature of intra-SAARC investment 
flows and emerging trade and investment links within the region. They explored the 
evidence on the trade-investment links in South Asia by focusing on the textile and 
garment sectors as well as on some firm-level evidence from Sri Lanka. On the basis of 
this preliminary analysis, they believed that though the extent of these trade-investment 
links in the SAARC region were still rather limited, they  indicated the potential. ADB-
UNCTAD (2008) has shown that the lowering of tariffs following SAFTA will attract FDI 
from outside the region into South Asia. SAFTA may not only increase intra-regional 
trade but also attract more vertically integrated FDI into the region.  
 
Evidently, the above review of quantitative estimates does not unambiguously support 
the intuitive case for greater regional integration. The results from exercises based on 
gravity and CGE models apparently yield different results. These could well be due to 
the former being able to take into account some of the non-economic factors which CGE 
models cannot. Thus, it is not surprising to see that in general gravity models yield 
higher welfare gains. Moreover, all these studies, whether based on gravity type or CGE 
models, are undertaken at a reasonably high level of aggregation. If we could use more 
disaggregated (for example six digit) data, these exercises would yield higher welfare 
gains as some of the substitution effects across sectors are avoided. For example both 
Pakistan and India are seen as textile and handicraft exporting economies with limited 
complementarities. However, when data at the six-digit level are considered, it emerges 
that there are only four over-lapping items between India and Pakistan in their top ten 
exports. This is possibly another area for useful future research.  
 
Quantitative estimates of welfare gains from regional integration are essentially based 
on a static understanding of economic processes in South Asia. As Taneja and others 
point out, informal border trade is nearly twice as large as the formal trade within South 
Asia. There is also enough anecdotal evidence on fairly large cross border movement of 




magnitudes are put together, there would be in our view a significant increase in the net 
welfare impact of greater trade integration in South Asia.   
 
Even more important perhaps is to realize that trade flows critically depend upon the 
state of infrastructure—especially cross border infrastructure—the level of transaction 
costs that remain unacceptably high because of poor trade facilitation and other 
bureaucratic procedural delays, and the large number of often opaque and arbitrarily 
applied non-tariff barriers. It has been estimated (Hertel and Mertel 2008) that gains from 
improving trade facilitation are significantly larger than those which accrue from a 
reduction in tariffs. Procedural delays and regulatory requirements create a regime of 
great uncertainty, as different from risks that can be estimated in probabilistic terms, in 
intra-regional trade. This uncertainty is compounded by the presence of similar factors 
on both sides of the border and acts as a strong deterrent to trade and investment. The 
quantitative models do not and, by their nature, cannot take into account the impact of 
these factors, which are both non-tradable and non-estimable in their nature. Their 
inclusion, while estimating net welfare impact of enhanced trade flows, could be the 
agenda for future research.   
 
Further motivation for greater economic cooperation in the South Asian region emerges 
from four important factors: First, pure economic efficiency gains through efficient use of 
capital and labor that result from a freer cross-border movement of goods and services. 
These gains will be significantly higher once cross border production networks expand in 
South Asia as they have done in South East Asia, resulting in a significant expansion of 
intra-industry trade, the most dynamic aspect of intra-regional trade. This necessitates 
improvement in the regional business environment and connectivity, which should 
therefore be the highest priority for South Asian governments. Second, there are other, 
non-traditional gains from greater regional integration, such as increased FDI as regional 
markets become more accessible to outside investors. Third, there are strategic benefits 
for South Asian countries negotiating as a unified group in a multilateral forum. Fourth, 
there are developmental and environmental efficiency gains arising from adopting a 
regionally integrated approach towards provision of regional public goods such as 
environment, water conservation, infrastructure and other natural resources including the 
regional ecosystem and related biodiversity. These regional issues cannot be effectively 
addressed individually and are best addressed in a cooperative framework. The 
quantitative, model-based exercises cannot take these welfare-raising effects of greater 
regional trade and investment integration, for obvious reasons.  
  
While the economic gains (including the less traditional) that arise from intra-industry 
trade and investment flows are well discussed in the literature, it is useful to point to the 
political and security motivations for regional cooperation in South Asia. These 
considerations are often the main driving force behind the emergence of regional blocs 
(Crawford and Fiorentino 2005, 16). For example, it was the fear of the People’s 
Republic of China dominance that drove the Southeast Asian economies to form 
ASEAN, and even the EU was seen as a response to the post-war emergence of the 
United States and the East European bloc under the USSR.  In this context it is useful to 
note that the terrorist threat to India and Pakistan is prompting the government 
establishments in the two countries to improve their relationship and support political 
dialogue to ensure political stability and social harmony. This has resulted in the India’s Role in South Asia Trade and Investment Integration  |       9 
 
 
‘Composite Dialogue’ process, which denotes a real advance over the earlier position 
under which no forward movement was possible without addressing the so-called core 
issue of Kashmir.  Greater regional and bilateral cooperation within emerging economies 
can also be seen as a response to the slow progress in multilateral trade regimes and 
increasing recourse to regionalism within developed economies.
5  
 
The other main driver of economic integration in South Asia is the need for greater 
energy security. All these countries are heavily dependent on energy imports and even 
more specifically on hydrocarbon imports from West Asia.  At the greater Asian regional 
level the SAARC economies can be seen to offer a unified market for hydrocarbon 
imports from Central and West Asian gas and oil fields by overland pipelines. Energy 
trade in the region can also be seen as a confidence-building measure and a lock-in 
mechanism for irreversible economic interdependence (Pandian 2005). With 
Afghanistan’s membership in the SAARC, the region can expect further potential gains 
through alliance with Central Asian countries, with immediate and significant benefits for 
Afghanistan.   
 
In our view, therefore, there is a strong case, based on economic and strategic grounds, 
for greater regional trade and investment integration in South Asia. The important 
question, of course, is that if this is known to policy makers in the region, then why has 
there been so little progress over the last two and a half decades in promoting regional 
economic cooperation in this part of the world? This merits a serious enquiry for 
identifying those elements or categories of economic and political agents whose 
interests could be harmed by greater regional economic cooperation and who are in 
sufficiently strong positions to be able to thwart attempts at promoting regional 
integration among SAARC members.   
 
 
3.   Trade and Investment Patterns in South Asia  
 
As mentioned earlier, intra-regional trade in South Asian countries, at 19% of total trade 
in 1948, decreased to 2% by 1967 as governments adopted inward-looking and import-
substituting policies, backed up by high tariff and non-tariff import barriers. The low share 
began to increase only during the 1990s, with the adoption of unilateral trade policy 
liberalization in the individual countries (World Bank, 2004). During 1996–2006, the 
volume of trade among the member countries quadrupled from $2.214 billion to $9.778 
billion and has been growing at a rate faster than the region’s trade with the world. Intra-
regional trade rose from 4.2% in 1995, then stagnated at around 5% until 2005, and is 
presently 5.5%.
6 The stagnation in intra-regional trade could indicate that trade 
expansion impulses from mutual tariff reduction have perhaps played out and have no 
further potential. This would also point to the need now for identifying the non-tariff 
                                                           
5  A total of 211 regional trade agreements for goods and services are in force today. While 124 regional 
trade agreements for goods were notified in the GATT (some no longer in force) during 1948–94, more 
than 130 agreements covering trade in goods and services, as of September 15, 2006, had been 
notified since 1995 under the World Trade Organization, (WTO website www.wto.org/english/tratop_ 
e/region_e/summary_e.xls, accessed December 6, 2006).   
6  Wijesinghe S.’ Economic and Political Utility of the SAARC Summit to Sri Lanka’, Daily News, July 23, 




barriers to trade, as is being attempted under the agreement reached at the Delhi 
SAARC summit, and to improve the trade infrastructure and facilitation process.   
 
With intra-regional trade accounting for a mere 5% of the region’s total trade, South Asia 
is considered the least integrated region among regional trade arrangements such as 
NAFTA (42%), EU (65%), and ASEAN (24%). However, the position changes if India, 
which clearly overshadows all estimates, is dropped. This is also brought out in Table 3, 
which shows that India sources less than 1% of its imports from the region and only 
exports 5.5% of its total exports to countries in South Asia. But the commonly held 
perception that the low level of imports by India is due to its highly protected economy 
may not necessarily be true.
7 A recent World Bank study shows that though the number 
of tariff preferences for Bangladesh has increased steadily since 2001, its exports to 
India have stagnated. The study suggests that the reason for low imports from 
Bangladesh could be due to supply-side factors in Bangladesh not due to a lack of 
demand or protection in India (World Bank 2006).   
 
Today the MFN tariff for Indian manufacturing is 10% on average, effectively eroding the 
advantage SAARC members have in the Indian market both relative to imports from 
other sources and also from domestic enterprises now competing successfully with 
relatively low tariff protection. This implies that the tariff arbitrage enjoyed by South Asian 
firms has been eroded. This comes out rather sharply in the case of Sri Lankan exports 
of hydrogenated edible oils, copper and copper-based products and aluminum and 
aluminum-based products, exports of which have declined since 2005 with the lowering 
of import tariffs on these products by India. Unilateral liberalization practiced by all 
countries in South Asia has effectively eroded the advantages of mere tariff liberalization 
under SAFTA.   
 
Given the relatively slow rate of expansion of intra-regional trade, despite the recent 
decline in tariff levels, attention has been directed to the prevalence of non-tariff barriers 
to trade in the region. At the Delhi Summit, it was agreed that all SAARC member 
countries will undertake detailed studies of non-tariff barriers that impede imports from 
neighboring countries. The removal of these non-tariff barriers would surely contribute to 
a rapid expansion of intra-regional trade. At the same time, given that intra-industry trade 
is generated to a large extent from investment in cross border production capacities, the 
region should now aim at deeper regional integration that would generate much larger 
volumes of cross border investment and expansion of intra-industry trade.  
  
But it is worth pointing out that with India’s exclusion, estimates of the share of intra-
regional trade in the region’s total trade rises from about 5% to 11% in 2006–07. This is 
a significant increase in the share of intra-regional trade and shows that businesses in 
other South Asian countries are more regionally oriented than in India. Indian firms 
clearly find non-regional export markets and import sources more attractive. It would 
therefore be a strong policy suggestion that both India and its regional partners take the 
steps necessary to make regional markets and supply sources more attractive for Indian 
firms. Some Indian, as well as Sri Lankan and Pakistani, firms are developing sector or 
                                                           
7  If we look at SADC, the exports of South Africa (the largest country in SADC) to member countries, 
were 10.1% but it sourced merely 2.2% of its imports from the region in 2006.  India’s Role in South Asia Trade and Investment Integration  |       11 
 
 
even sub-sectoral specializations which make them more technologically advanced and 
more intensively connected to global markets than firms operating in the same sector in 
other countries. This increasing specialization can become the basis for expanding intra-
firm trade within South Asia.
8 But it requires the urgent improvement of investment 
conditions in all SAARC countries.    
 
Though most trade of the countries in the region has always been extra-regional, the 
most important trading partners being the United States and EU, in recent times, the 
South Asian market has become important, especially for smaller countries such as 
Afghanistan and Nepal. For Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, the region is an important source 




Table 3: Intra Regional Trade for SAARC Region (Average over 2002–06) 
 
Intra Regional Exports    Intra Regional Imports 
Share in    Share in  Country  Average 
Value 
($ million)  Region  Own  Total 
Exports   
Average  
Value 
($ million)  Region 
Own  Total 
Imports 
Afghanistan 83  1.2  41.9   896  13.2  39.8 
Bangladesh 145 2.1  1.8    1836  27.1 15.2 
India 4474  66.2  5.5   984  14.5 0.9 
Maldives 17  0.2  13.9    127  1.9  20.0 
Nepal 319  4.7  51.9    762  11.2  45.9 
Pakistan 1209  17.9 8.9    573  8.5  2.8 
Sri Lanka  508  7.5  8.7    1598  23.6  19.4 
SAARC Region  6754  100.0  6.2    6776  100.0  4.4 
 




India naturally dominates the region’s trade as it has common borders with all the 
countries of South Asia (except Afghanistan). Table 4 reveals that India’s trade with all 
countries increased from 1995 to 2006, with a large proportion of total exports to the 
region going to India. There have also been changes in the direction of the region’s 
trade. In 1995, 61.5% of India’s exports to the region went to Bangladesh, but this 
decreased to 30.7% in 2006. On the other hand, Bangladesh’s export share to India 
increased from 42.3% in 1995 to 63.5 % in 2006.   
 
                                                           
8  As Das (2007) suggests, despite the problems facing these countries they should continue to 
regionalize because as they move up their respective growth trajectories, they are likely to gain in 




India-Sri Lanka trade too has increased tremendously and India has become the most 
important trading partner for Sri Lanka in the region. Some 86% of Sri Lanka’s exports to 
the region go to India and 35.5% of India’s exports to the region go to Sri Lanka. This 
could be due to the FTA between the two countries which became operational in 2000. 
There has also been an increase in India’s trade with Nepal and Pakistan in recent 
years, despite the trade with the latter being conducted still on the basis of a positive list 
and India not having been granted MFN status by Pakistan, in violation of World Trade 
Organization (WTO) norms and practices.  
 
 
Table 4: Direction of Intra-regional Trade  
(% of Total Exports of a Country in the Region) 
 
1995                         
From/to Afghanistan  Bangladesh India  Nepal Pakistan Sri  Lanka  Maldives  Bhutan
Afghanistan …  3.4  32.2  0.0 64.4  0.0  n.a  n.a 
Bangladesh 0.6  …  42.3  11.8 31.4  13.6  0.0  0.3 
India 0.9  61.5  …  6.9 4.5  24.6  0.8  0.8 
Nepal 0.0  11.9  83.6  … 1.5  3.0  0.0  n.a 
Pakistan 7.3  56.3  14.2  1.1 …  20.2  0.5 0.4 
Sri Lanka  1.0  11.8  31.4 0.0 42.2  …  13.7  n.a 
Maldives n.a  0.0  1.0 0.0  0.0  99.0    n.a 
 
2006                 
From/to Afghanistan  Bangladesh India  Nepal Pakistan Sri  Lanka  Maldives  Bhutan
Afghanistan …  2.2  50.0  0.0 47.7  0.1  n.a  n.a 
Bangladesh 0.5  …  63.5  1.9 27.8  4.7  0.0  1.8 
India 2.7  30.7  …  15.8 12.2  35.5  1.2  1.8 
Nepal 0.0  0.8  98.3  … 0.9  0.0  0.0  n.a 
Pakistan 60.0  12.0  19.0  0.2 …  8.7  0.2 0.0 
Sri Lanka  0.3  2.2  86.6  0.1 6.7  …  4.2  n.a 
Maldives n.a  0.0  5.9 0.0  0.0  94.1  …  n.a 
 
… = Data not available. 




If we look at the composition of intra-regional trade (Appendix I), both imports and 
exports seem to be concentrated in a few commodities, such as textile fibers, minerals 
and agricultural products. Though imports of the countries from the region are 
diversified, the top five exports comprise more that 60% of their total intra-regional 
exports. This relatively high level of product concentration in intra-regional exports 
makes these economies vulnerable to protective action by the importing country. Greater 
diversification of their export basket can reduce this vulnerability, but this has to be 
balanced against the need to fully exploit the country’s comparative and competitive 
advantage, which will be the basis for securing greater market shares globally.   India’s Role in South Asia Trade and Investment Integration  |       13 
 
 
3.1  Regional Trade Orientation  
 
UNCTAD-ADB (2008) has shown that in South Asia the number of products in which 
each country has a comparative advantage has increased. It also shows that the 
complementarity index has improved considerably overtime for Bangladesh, India and 
Sri Lanka, though it has declined for Pakistan. The Grubel Lloyd index, which measures 
intra-industry trade, shows that intra industry trade has increased in sectors such as 
agricultural raw materials, chemicals and textiles. The study also shows that intra-
industry trade has increased in some sub-sectors within textiles, indicating that countries 
are beginning to specialize in products at different stages of production which is the 
basis for intra-industry trade and as a result, manufactured goods now make up a larger 
share of overall trade in the region.   
 
This paper looks at a different aspect of intra-regional trade. Since complementarities in 
trade seem to be increasing we identify the products that have experienced large 
increases in regional trade orientation.
9 Data has been obtained from UNCTAD’s 
Personal Computer Trade Analysis System (PC-TAS). To evaluate the orientation of 
trade, two time periods have been used.
10 Table 5 presents the list of 33 HS Code two-
digit products that have met two criteria. As suggested by Yeats, in order to eliminate 
marginal products, only those products have been considered whose two year average 
(1995–96) was greater than $5,000 in intra-regional trade and, second, these products 
registered the highest growth rate between 1995–96 and 2003–04.  
 
The results presented in the table show that regional orientation has increased despite 
the fact that a reduction in trade costs and global trade liberalization has made distant 
markets more accessible. There are some products for which regional orientation was 
less than one in 1995–96, indicating that the countries imported these products from 
outside the region. But the higher ROI index in 2003–04 implies that imports are being 
sourced from the region itself. As many of the products with increased regional 
                                                           
9  The methodology of the Regional Orientation Index (ROI) as suggested by Yeats (1997) has been 
used. ROI measures the relative importance of intra-regional exports for a product. Yeats used the 
index to study regional orientation of trade flows within MERCOSUR. Though his aim was to find out if 
regional integration had led to trade diversion, no attempt has been made to see if the reorientation of 
trade in South Asia has led to trade creation or trade diversion. Though regional integration is 
considered to be advantageous when trade diversion is less than trade creation, this is a static gain. We 
believe that even if the integration is trade diverting it is beneficial if the overall benefits are greater than 
the costs. For example, regional integration may enable member countries to export successfully and 
have a sustained high rate of growth, enjoy the benefits of economies of scale due to the increased size 
of the market. 
10  As the export data is volatile, an average for two years 1995–1996 and 2003–2004 has been used. 
Because data is unavailable the countries that have been included are India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka 
and Pakistan. Export data for Pakistan is not available for the years 1995 and 1996, and has therefore 
been estimated from the imports of various countries. Regional orientation has been studied at two digit 
HS Code level. 














) is the share of product j in intra-




) is its share in exports to the world. An index value above unity indicates a 
concentration of exports to the regional markets. While the index does not provide much useful 
information when observed at a single point in time, its development over time may reveal interesting 





11 less than one, regional integration has helped South Asian 
firms to expand production in sectors where they would otherwise have been unable to 
compete in the world. Resource-based or agricultural products appear to have increased 
their regional orientation, with some manufacturing products also showing higher 
regional concentration. Though there is some increase in textiles, regional orientation 
has not increased in very many products in the category, namely in HS Code 50 to 63. 
This could be because of their inclusion in the sensitive lists of all the member countries. 
The increase in chemicals could be because in the first three rounds of negotiations 
under SAPTA most of the concessions offered were in chemicals, textiles, machinery 
and chemical appliances. Increasing regional orientation in at least some sectors 
demonstrates that SAFTA, despite its several limitations discussed below, is beginning to 
change firms’ behavior and making them gradually more oriented towards regional 
markets. With greater flow of cross border investment and improvement in conditions 
affecting regional trade, this regional orientation is bound to increase in future.   
 
 
Table 5: Regional Orientation and Revealed Comparative Advantage Indexes 
 
HS Code  Description  ROI_95  ROI_04  RCA_95 
27   Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc   1.25   2.16   0.24  
15   Animal, vegetable fats and oils, cleavage products, etc   0.60   4.69   1.03  
29   Organic chemicals   0.54   1.10   0.72  
73   Articles of iron or steel   0.84   1.38   0.61  
39   Plastics and articles thereof   0.94   1.30   0.34  
33   Essential oils, perfumes, cosmetics, toiletries   0.78   1.81   0.58  
54   Manmade filaments   0.58   1.02   2.13  
  7   Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers   4.79   7.14   0.85  
38   Miscellaneous chemical products   0.71   0.78   0.51  
23   Residues, wastes of food industry, animal fodder   0.92   3.10   3.67  
28   Inorganic chemicals, precious metal compound, isotopes   1.65   1.86   0.65  
85   Electrical, electronic equipment   1.12   1.18   0.14  
26   Ores, slag and ash   0.26   0.16   2.99  
76   Aluminum and articles thereof   2.52   2.20   0.31  
19   Cereal, flour, starch, milk preparations and products   4.37   3.60   0.24  
72   Iron and steel   2.23   1.22   0.71  
30   Pharmaceutical products   1.71   1.26   1.08  
12   Oil seed, fruits, grain, seed, fruit, etc, nes   1.10   1.29   1.43  
55   Manmade staple fibers   0.70   1.16   3.05  
49   Printed books, newspapers, pictures etc   3.43   2.37   0.19  
63   Other made textile articles, sets, worn clothing etc   0.13   0.08   11.86  
                                                           
11 Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) has been calculated for 1995. (RCA) measures a 
country’s/region’s comparative advantage in a product and is estimated by, RCAi = (Xi, S. Asia/ΣX S. 
Asia) / (Xi, World/ΣX World). Where: RCAi = Revealed Comparative Advantage for good i. Xi, S. Asia= 
exports of good i by S. Asia ΣX S. Asia = total exports by S. Asia Xi, World = world exports of good i ΣX 
World = total world exports If RCAi > 1, then S. Asia has a comparative advantage in good i. If RCAi < 
1, then S. Asia has a comparative disadvantage in good i. India’s Role in South Asia Trade and Investment Integration  |       15 
 
 
HS Code  Description  ROI_95  ROI_04  RCA_95 
25   Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, plaster, lime and cement   4.46   3.11   2.00  
69   Ceramic products   1.54   1.60   0.60  
84   Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc   1.91   1.08   0.14  
70   Glass and glassware   2.80   1.54   0.34  
10   Cereals   4.28   3.65   3.91  
87   Vehicles other than railway, tramway   3.92   2.61   0.21  
  9   Coffee, tea, mate and spices   0.82   1.14   9.68  
34   Soaps, lubricants, waxes, candles, modeling pastes   4.87   3.69   0.32  
53   Vegetable textile fibres nes, paper yarn, woven fabric   1.41   1.84   14.96  
48   Paper & paperboard, articles of pulp, paper and board   7.01   3.49   0.12  
99   Commodities not elsewhere specified   0.73   0.81   0.51  
  8   Edible fruit, nuts, peel of citrus fruit, melons   1.81   1.64   2.12  
32   Tanning, dyeing extracts, tannins, pigments etc   1.72   1.29   1.22  
71   Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc   0.02   0.01   6.95  
40   Rubber and articles thereof   2.40   1.59   1.10  
 
Source: Calculated from PCTAS data.  
 
 
3.2  Trends in FDI  
 
World FDI flows have grown at an annual average rate of 21.2%.
12 South Asian 
governments recognize the benefits from FDI and all of them have liberalized the 
conditions governing FDI inflows. This is reflected in FDI inflows to South Asia which 
increased by nearly 8 times between 1996 and 2006 (Table 6).  
 
However, the effect of regional integration of South Asian countries seems to have been 
insignificant on FDI, with the share of South Asia in world FDI remaining less than 2% of 
world FDI inflows, despite doubling in 2006. Moreover, there does not appear to be any 
significant increase in intra-regional FDI flows despite the emergence of a number of 
multinational corporations (MNC) from within the region, especially from India.   
 
Table 7 presents the inflow of FDI by country over the period 1996–2006. India saw an 
increase in cross border mergers and acquisitions in the telecommunications, business 
process outsourcing, and pharmaceutical industries, while the improved investment 
environment and the privatization of assets in Pakistan and Bangladesh contributed to 
increased FDI inflows to those countries. However there have been variations. All the 
countries in the South Asian region except India have received very negligible FDI 
inflows. The dominance of India in FDI in South Asia is largely due to the size of its 
economy. But if we look at per capita FDI, then even if India accounted for 75% of the 
South Asia’s inflows (2006), it fares no better than Bangladesh, while Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka have done better.   
                                                           
12  FDI flows to developed countries have typically been much higher. The top two FDI destination regions 
have been the European Union and the US, with shares of world total FDI flows of 41% and 13% 
respectively. 




One of the reasons behind poor FDI flow in South Asia, it has been argued, is the 
relatively small size of individual country markets and the relative failure of regional 
integration efforts in unifying these markets by removing border and behind-the-border 
impediments and weaknesses. Studies have also shown that a country’s business 
environment and institutional quality are equally if not more important for FDI than low 
wages or concessions for investments etc. However, the countries of South Asia are 
considered among the least competitive in the world. The global competitiveness index 
which ranks countries on a broad range of indicators such as institutions, 
macroeconomics, infrastructure, business sophistication and innovations ranked these 
countries, except India (50), near the bottom in the set of 137 countries that were 
considered. Bangladesh is at 111, Nepal at 126, Pakistan 104, and Sri Lanka 80. 
Political interference and corruption combine to make this a high risk region for potential 
investors. Other problems include, FDI regimes not matching international best 
practices, trade regimes still biased against exports, high transaction costs, and the 
presence of non-transparent procedures and bureaucratic delays (Irwin 2003).   
 
 
Table 6: Share in World FDI of Selected Regions and South Asia 
 
EU  USA  PRC  ASEAN  S. Asia   World  EU  USA  PRC  ASEAN S. Asia Year 
  $ million        Share in World FDI (%)   
1996   124811   84455   41726   30490  3359   392743  31.78 21.50 10.62   7.76   0.86 
1997   142400  103398   45257   34307  5371   489243  29.11 21.13  9.25   7.01   1.10 
1998   281000  174434   45463   22276  3889  709303  39.62  24.59  6.41   3.14   0.55 
1999   502636  283376   40319   28766  3234   1098896  45.74  25.79  3.67   2.62   0.29 
2000   695277  314007   40715   23540  4658   1411366  49.26  22.25  2.88   1.67   0.33 
2001   381558  159461   46878   20729  6415  832567  45.83  19.15  5.63   2.49   0.77 
2002   307345   74457   52743   18024  6984   621995  49.41 11.97  8.48   2.90   1.12 
2003   256707   53146   53505   24491  5469   564078  45.51  9.42  9.49   4.34   0.97 
2004   204245  135826   60630   35245  7601  742143  27.52  18.30  8.17   4.75   1.02 
2005   486409  101025   72406   41071  9866  945795  51.43  10.68  7.66   4.34   1.04 
2006   530976  175394   69468   51483  22274   1305852  40.66  13.43  5.32   3.94   1.71 
 




The manufacturing sector in Pakistan, especially the all-important textile sector, has 
received hardly any FDI inflows. In Bangladesh too, non-tradable sectors such as 
transport, and the telecommunication sector have attracted the largest share of FDI (see 
Appendix II).
13 It is clear that these countries have to make an effort to attract FDI in their 
                                                           
13 See  www.iptu.co.uk/content/srilanka_investment.asp#FDI India’s Role in South Asia Trade and Investment Integration  |       17 
 
 
export sectors and these efforts could be profitably focused on emerging MNCs from 
within the region. This will increase the competitiveness of the region, step up overall 
FDI, and increase the share of the region in world FDI flows.  
 
Table 7: FDI Inflows in South Asia ($ Million) 
 
Year S.  Asia  Afghanistan  Bangladesh Bhutan India  Maldives Nepal  Pakistan  Sri  Lanka
1996 3359  1  232 1  2525  9  19  439  133 
1997 5371  -1  575  -1  3619  11  23  711  433 
1998 3889  0  576  -  2633  12  12  506  150 
1999 3234  6  309 1  2168  12  4  532  201 
2000 4658  0  579 0  3585  13  0  309  173 
2001 6415  1  355 0  5472  12  21  383  172 
2002 6984  1  328 2  5627  12  -6  823  197 
2003 5469  2  350 3  4323  14  15  534  229 
2004 7601  1  460 3  5771  15  0  1118  233 
2005 9866  4  692 9  6676  9  2  2201  272 
2006 22274 2  625  6  16881  14 -7  4273  480 
Cumulative 79119  15  5082  25  59280  133  83  11829  2672 
 
Source: UNCTAD.  
 
 
While extra regional FDI has been far greater than intra-regional investments, intra-
regional investments seem to be increasing. Most intra-regional FDI flows are from 
Indian firms (Table 8). However these flows are insignificant, accounting for only 1.5% of 
India’s total outward FDI. Apart from a few resource-rich countries, Indian outward FDI 
has been generally directed towards developed economies and has been motivated by 
the market size as well as access to frontier and strategically needed technologies that 
will improve global competitiveness.    
 
In Nepal and Bhutan, India is the predominant source of FDI. It has also emerged as the 
largest investor in Sri Lanka.
14 
 
Not only have the countries failed to attract ample FDI, they have also failed to attract 
FDI in their export sectors. This can be seen from the fact that the sectors receiving the 
most FDI in India are transport and electrical equipment rather than export-oriented 
                                                           
14  The principal sectors in Sri Lanka which have attracted Indian investment are steel, cement, rubber 
products, tourism, computer software, IT-training and other professional services. Some of the Indian 
investments are Lanka Indian Oil Corporation, TATAs (Taj Hotels, VSNL, Watawala tea plantations) 
Apollo Hospitals, LIC , L & T (now Aditya Birla Group), Ambujas, Rediffusion, Ceat, Nicholas Piramal, 
Jet Airways, Sahara, Indian Airlines and Ashok Leyland. Indian Human Resources and Education 




sectors such as gems and jewelry, pharmaceuticals, textiles, etc. Financial services, 
telecommunications and the energy sector have received the bulk of FDI in Pakistan.  
 
 
Table 8: Intra-Regional FDI in South Asia (% of Country Total) 
 
  India  Bangladesh  Pakistan  Nepal  Sri Lanka
 2001-03  2006-07  1995-96 2005-06 2001-05 2006-08 Up  to2006  2006-07  2005 
India       0.62   0.54   0.00   0.00   40.71   46.60   6.20  
Bangladesh   …  …      0.05   0.10   0.75   …  0.18*  
Pakistan   …  …  1.40   1.87       0.47   …  0.60*  
Nepal    … …  …  … … …      … 
Sri Lanka   0.01   0.01   0.23   0.41   …  …  0.13   …   
Bhutan   …  …  0.01   …  …  …  0.01   …  … 
Maldives    0.01   0.01   0.00   … … …  0.00   …  n.a. 
Share of 
South Asia   0.02   0.02   2.25   2.82   0.06   0.10   41.80   46.60   7.00  
 
Source: As in Aggarwal (2008).  
… = Data not available. * pertain to the year 2000.  
 
 
Indian investments in Bangladesh include the state-of-the-art modern hospital in Dhaka 
in collaboration with India’s Apollo Group. Many Indian companies are also involved in 
the information technology and ready-made garments sector in Bangladesh. In what 
could be a trend setter, a French-owned cement project in northeast Bangladesh will 
source its limestone from across the border in Meghalaya. Over 100 Indian joint 
ventures currently operate in Nepal, accounting for 36-40% of its total FDI.
15  
 
There is great potential for intra-regional investment, especially in infrastructure. India, 
for instance, has invested in hydro projects in Bhutan and buys back the electricity, and 
has played an important role in infrastructure development in Nepal.
16 There is huge 
scope for further infrastructure investment in South Asia, both in cross-border and 
national projects. The countries will benefit immensely from development of a cross 
border highway network, which apparently used to exist even in the pre-British period 
and facilitated movement of goods and personnel all across the region from Kabul to 
Dhaka. This is now in severe disrepair and needs rehabilitation and expansion. Similarly, 
the creation of a regional transmission grid for electricity will promote the development of 
                                                           
15  These joint ventures are in tourism, infrastructure, consumer durables and non-durables and export-
oriented industries such as garments and carpets. A number of Indian companies, including Dabur, 
Hindustan Lever, Colgate, etc., have established their manufacturing base in Nepal with the objective to 
export their finished products to India. 
16  The Tribhuvan Airport at Kathmandu, roads from Kathmandu to Dakshinkali, Trishuli, Balaju, Godavari 
and Raxaul were built with Indian assistance. With the construction of bridges by Gammon India Ltd on 
the Kohalpur Mahakali sector of East West Highway, the Mahendra Raj Marg in Far Western Nepal has 
become operational even during monsoons and has opened up this part of Nepal bordering India to 
new possibilities in trade, investment and economic growth. India’s Role in South Asia Trade and Investment Integration  |       19 
 
 
hydro-power in the North East and could even facilitate the transfer of surplus energy 
from Central Asian economies to South Asia. The benefits of greater transport, 
communication and energy connectivity cannot be captured in any quantitative exercise 
but are estimated to be very significant. The resource requirements for infrastructure 
development in South Asia are gigantic. In India alone, Planning Commission estimates 
put the resource requirement at $500 billion for the next five years to meet the needs of 
growing population and rapid urbanization. Regional cooperation can offer multilateral 
agencies and the private sector attractive investment opportunities in developing the 
physical infrastructure in the region.  
 
However, the regional investment climate is far from satisfactory. At present, Pakistan 
and India do not permit cross border investments, ostensibly on security grounds. But 
this could change with the recent liberalization announced by the new Pakistan 
government, which has also enlarged the positive list for Indo-Pakistan trade. Some 
investment, like exports, from India nevertheless manages to reach Pakistan, as in the 
case of Dabur establishing facilities in Pakistan by 2008 from its subsidiary registered in 
Dubai. It is time that both countries remove restrictions on mutual investment as this will 
have significant, positive economy-wide impacts.   
 
Though small, other members of the region are also finding bilateral investment 
opportunities. Bangladesh increased its investment in Pakistan in the last two years 
(Aggarwal, 2008). Sri Lanka is the largest investor in India from the region (Table 9). 
While Indian investment in the region goes to the manufacturing sector, Sri Lankan 
investment is concentrated mainly in the service sector.  
 
 
Table 9: Country-wise Distribution of FDI Projects from SAARC Region in India 
 
  SAARC countries  Sri Lanka  Bangladesh  Maldives  Nepal 
1998-00    17   10   4   3   0  
2001   7   7   - -  0  
2002   4   3   1   -  0  
2003   3   3   - -  0  
2005   11   9   1   1   0  
2006   7   7   0   0   0  
2007   6   6   0   0   0  
 
Source: Aggarwal (2008).  
 
 
Political considerations have become an important factor holding back investment flows, 
not only between India and Pakistan but also between India and Bangladesh and India 
and Nepal. Tatas is a well-known example: it proposed an investment of $2 billion in 
Bangladesh in steel, fertilizer and power plants at terms that looked highly favorable to 
the host economy. But this has not moved forward despite the Bangladesh government 
being reportedly inclined favorably towards it. The bid by Indian construction and power 




plant through a joint venture with the state-owned utility, Nepal Electricity Authority, has 
also run into public and legal opposition. The important question on which further primary 
research needs to be undertaken is to understand the underlying causes for this political 
opposition to investment from Indian firms in neighboring countries and for examining if 
the security concerns that presently prevent cross border investments between India and 
Pakistan are justified. This would yield significant benefits because, as we have argued, 
in South Asia, as in other regions, trade expansion could well be premised upon higher 
investment activity.  
 
 
4.   Progress in Policy-Led Initiatives and Challenges for South 
Asia Trade and Investment Integration  
 
SAARC was established in 1985 but it took a long time for the heads of its member 
governments to include a core area like trade in the organization’s ambit. This happened 
when SAPTA was signed, which became operational in December 1995. The basic 
objective of SAPTA was to strengthen intra-regional economic cooperation and the 
development of South Asian economies. But once again the progress in trade 
liberalization and integration in South Asia was slow. The many reasons given for the 
low impact made by SAPTA in increasing intra-regional trade included long sensitive 
lists, low trade coverage, exclusion of most of the traded commodities, limited depth of 
tariff cuts, failure to deal with non-tariff issues and complex product specific rules of 
origin. The inability of the two largest economies in the region, India and Pakistan, to 
resolve their political tensions has also been a major stumbling block in achieving 
effective regional cooperation.  
 
In 2004 SAFTA replaced SAPTA. The idea of creating SAFTA was first mooted in 1995. 
The Ninth SAARC Summit in 1997 created a twelve-member Group of Eminent Persons 
(GEP), which at the Tenth SAARC Summit in Colombo in 1998 submitted the report 
SAARC: Vision Beyond the Year 2000 envisioning economic union by 2020 in three 
stages. These included SAARC becoming a Free Trade Area by the year 2010, a 
Customs Union by 2015 and an Economic Union by 2020, with a Regional Investment 
Agreement to be concluded prior to the region becoming a free trade area. But due to 
the rapid deterioration in Indo-Pakistan relations (the Kargil War) the process was 
delayed. A commitment was made at the Eleventh SAARC Summit at Kathmandu in 
2002 for the creation of a South Asian Economic Union (SAEU). Finally, at the Twelfth 
Summit at Islamabad in 2004, the Framework Agreement for a South Asia Free Trade 
Area was signed.   
 
SAARC members ratified SAFTA with the objective of reducing tariffs for intraregional 
trade in goods among the SAARC member countries. SAFTA became operational in 
2006. Under Article 7 of SAFTA, a phased tariff liberalization program is envisaged. In 
the first two years, non-LDCs are expected to bring down tariffs to 20%, while LDCs will 
bring them down to 30%. Non-LDCs will then bring down tariffs from 20% to 0–5% in the 
next five years, Sri Lanka (a non-LDC) in six years and LDCs (from 30% to 0–5%) in 
eight years. Moreover, non-LDCs will reduce their tariffs for LDC products to 0–5% in 




17   
 
  Products that can qualify for SAFTA preferences are also subject to rules of origin, 
sensitive lists, balance of payments, and safeguard measures. As discussed above, the 
agreement also has provisions for special and differential treatment of LDCs such as 
longer time periods for tariff reduction, consideration for applying antidumping and/or 
countervailing measures, and others. The SAARC agreement refers to some additional 
measures that can be considered in future negotiations. These include harmonization of 
standards, reciprocal recognition of tests and accreditation of testing laboratories, 
simplification and harmonization of customs clearance, import licensing, registration and 
banking procedures and removal of barriers to intra-SAARC investment. With its scope 
principally on import tariffs and having left the non-tariff barriers and ‘behind the border 
measures’ to be negotiated in future, SAFTA represents a case of ‘shallow integration’ 
and commensurately low ambition. This is particularly so because SAFTA excluded 
services which constitute more than half of GDP in almost all member countries. This 
major omission is, however, being rectified with a decision at the last summit to explore 
the possibility of including services under SAFTA. As we have argued above, a shallow 
form of regional integration will not deliver the desired results in South Asia because an 
expansion in trade flows is premised upon the development of regional infrastructure 
and lowering of transactions costs and elimination of non-transparent procedures. 
SAARC must, in our view, create the conditions for a deeper form of integration that 
promotes cross border investment and encourages greater transactional transparency 
by simplifying the procedures and harmonizing standards, qualifications etc.  
 
More recently, there has been agreement on establishing a South Asian university in 
Delhi and the project has already been initiated. The 2008 Colombo Summit saw 
progress also in other areas and, more importantly, a stronger overall recognition of the 
importance of regional cooperation and a greater degree of commitment for achieving it. 
This has been to some extent overshadowed by the tragic attacks in Mumbai in 
November 2008, but this further reinforces our earlier argument that regional 
cooperation needs to be pushed beyond the point where random shocks can derail the 
process.  
 
SAFTA in its present form and with its long timelines, therefore, represents an 
unsatisfactory agreement.
18 We also expect that without a concerted and sustained push 
from all member countries, SAFTA goals will not be achieved. There are several reasons 
for which SAFTA’s implementation is not simply a routine affair and requires on-going 
commitment from all concerned including the SAARC secretariat:   
 
• Pakistan has ratified SAFTA but needs to shift to a negative list for its trade with 
India. The sooner it can afford MFN treatment to India the better, as this is an 
                                                           
17  Prior to the Fourteenth SAARC Summit in New Delhi in April 2007, India announced its decision to allow 
duty free access from all LDCs including from South Asia. This became effective from January 2008 
and represents a significant unilateral action. 
18  Please also see Dubey Muchkund (2008) where he argues on similar lines and calls for a revision of the 
agreement so that it better represents the goals set by the Group of Eminent Persons and also has 
timelines that will keep the momentum and not allow vested interests to derail the process of regional 




unnecessary irritation in the relations between the two countries. It is also ineffective 
as Indian exports find their way into Pakistan in any case, but their prices are higher 
as they have to be routed through other transit destinations such as Dubai.
19 Under 
SAFTA trade between non-LDC member countries should be liberalized by 2013, but 
judging by the present situation, this will not happen between India and Pakistan, to 
the detriment of regional cooperation in South Asia. This anomalous position 
between the two largest economies in South Asia not only reduces the value of any 
trade agreement in the region, but also vitiates the overall environment for pushing 
cooperation forward. In addition, it gives all those opposed to regional integration the 
best reason for not moving ahead and to cite this as the basis for continuing to 
distrust Pakistan’s commitment to regional integration. Civil society within Pakistan 
and all those seriously supportive of South Asian regional integration should now 
work to change Pakistan’s ill conceived stand. This puts it not only in opposition to 
the spirit of SAFTA but also violates its commitments under the WTO. Such blatant 
disregard for regional and international commitments should not be allowed to 
continue.   
 
• The time frame (by the year 2016) to reduce the tariffs to 0% is too long as by then 
tariff reduction to even lower level may have come about from multilateral trade 




• The sensitive lists are too large.
21 In Bangladesh it includes 1,249 items for least 
developed countries (LDCs) and 1,254 for non-LDCs, while India’s includes 763 
items on its sensitive lists for imports from LDCs and 884 for non-LDCs. Similarly 
Pakistan's sensitive list includes 1,183 products, Nepal 1,210 products, Sri Lanka 
1,065 items, Bhutan 157 and the Maldives includes 671 items. These sensitive lists 
apply to nearly 53% of current intra-SAARC imports.
22 India’s negative list covers 
even a larger proportion of its imports from these countries and is larger than what 
India has offered under the India Sri Lanka FTA and around three times larger than 
its latest offer under the FTA with ASEAN, which is in an advanced stage of 
negotiations.
23  
                                                           
19  So while Pakistan has notified tariff concessions on imports of 4,872 items from other member 
countries, imports from India remain restricted to the items on their positive list of 773 items, recently 
enlarged to 1,075 products. 
20  For example under the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISLFTA) India is expected to eliminate 
tariffs by 2003 and Sri Lanka by 2008. India already completed its tariff liberalization program on March 
18, 2003, thereby granting duty free status on 81% of all items. On the other hand, Sri Lanka is 
expected to complete its trade liberalization program by 2008, which would result in duty-free status to 
India on 77% of all items.  
21  These lists include products at six digit HS line, sub sectors. 
22  SAFTA has been notified under  Article XXIV of GATT which allows countries to grant special treatment 
to one another by establishing a  free trade association provided that duties and other trade restrictions 
would be “eliminated on substantially all the trade” among the participants. 
23  For example, less than 14% of Sri Lanka’s exports are covered by the Indian sensitive list under the 
Indo-Sri Lanka FTA, but nearly 42% of Sri Lanka’s exports are covered in the Indian sensitive list under 
the SAFTA Agreement (Dubey 2007, 2008). India's sensitive list includes Chapters 61 & 62 of garments India’s Role in South Asia Trade and Investment Integration  |       23 
 
 
• There is no binding commitment to reduce or remove the lists, though the 
agreement does talk about review of the sensitive list every four years.   
 
• Members are free to have bilateral agreements that include deeper tariff cuts and 
cover larger number of sectors, including sometimes service sectors. The non-
application clause in SAFTA allows that concessions negotiated bilaterally or 
multilaterally need not be extended to other SAARC members. While these 
provisions are welcome, they pose the danger of making SAFTA redundant. 
Members should consider a region wide MFN which will make bilateral concessions 
applicable to all SAARC members.   
 
• Technical assistance in SAFTA, designed to assist LDCs in building their 
negotiating and trading capacities, is in the nature of ‘best endeavor clause’ without 
any binding commitments. Members may reconsider this clause and at least 
encourage special technical assistance programs with assistance from multilateral 
institutions. 
 
• There is no time frame under SAFTA for removing Non Tariff Barriers (NTBs). 
However, the recent agreement at the Delhi Summit to identify NTBs and hopefully 
reduce and eventually remove them is a welcome step forward. So is the 
establishment of the SAARC Standards Coordination Board, which would function as 
a precursor to the SAARC Regional Standards Body for achieving uniform quality 
standardization within the region.
24  
 
• Poor trade facilitation procedures and the consequent high transactions costs also 
add to NTBs. According to a World Bank study the costs of trading across borders in 
South Asia are among the highest in the world. Land border crossings, the main 
gateways to countries in the region, introduce significant delays and costs and, 
worse still, introduce unreliability of supply chains that pass through them. Das and 
Pohit (2005) estimate that the delay in a single shipment from India to Bangladesh is 
four days.
25 Efforts to improve their performance generally require changes in 
procedures rather than additional infrastructure (Arnold 2007). In a more recent 
paper Roy (2008) provides a comprehensive list of measures to improve trade 
facilitation and reduce the cost of cross border trade in the region. These should be 
on the agenda for joint action by SAARC member countries and by India in particular 
as the only country with common borders with all SAARC members.  
 
SAFTA’s weaknesses make it clear that SAARC could benefit from looking at the 
relatively successful East and Southeast Asian experiences in regional cooperation. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and hence blocks a large proportion of Bangladeshi exports to India, while Bangladesh’s sensitive list 
has yarn and blocks Indian exporters of these goods. Pakistan has placed the principal export items of 
Bangladesh namely, jute, fabrics, woven and knitted garments, special woven fabrics, footwear and 
textiles on their sensitive list. Pakistan’s sensitive list for India includes automobiles, auto-parts, and 
textile machinery etc. 
24  The main focus of the Board will be industries related to food, textile and chemicals. 
25  The maximum loss of time occurs in parking, customs clearances, and crossing the border (78 hours), 
followed by unloading at Benapole (nine hours). Therefore on average an Indian exporter incurs an 




These countries were also at a similar level of economic development when they 
initiated their regional integration efforts. So their experience can have relevance for 
South Asian economies. In a recent paper Chandra and Kumar (2007) address this 
issue and list a number of lessons that can be drawn from the East Asian experience. 
Briefly summarizing them, these are:   
 
(i) Most importantly, South Asian leadership should give primacy to economic issues 
and not allow political differences to stand in the way of regional cooperation;
26   
 
(ii) South Asia would do well to adopt the open regional approach followed in East 
Asia. South Asia followed inward-looking policies for a long time, and has been a 
latecomer to the concept of regional cooperation. And this inward-looking mind-set is 
still visible in the region’s approach to regionalism. As discussed above, the SAFTA 
accord is characterized by large negative lists, a limited number of products for tariff 
concessions, restrictive rules of origin, exclusion of services, and exclusion of issues 
such as para-tariffs and non-tariff barriers. This should change in favor of greater 
openness. East Asian economies have shown that bilateral and regional trade 
arrangements do not act as stumbling blocs for promoting multilateral trading 
negotiations. Therefore, South Asian governments should not view the process of 
bilateral or regional FTAs as inimical to the process of multilateral trade liberalization. 
However, Plummer’s ten point agenda should guide the design of any bilateral or 




(iii) In the literature, interstate distribution of power is identified as critical to the 
process of regional integration (Webber and Fort 2006). For example, some authors 
give a key role to hegemonic or dominant powers in providing a focal point around 
which policy coordination can take place and financial resources for more equitable 
distribution of gains could be provided (for example,,Maatli 1999). In the case of 
Europe, France and Germany have provided this focal point. As Taneja and 
Sawhney (2007) and Kumar (2008) suggest, India should now take the lead in 
revitalizing SAARC. Sawhney and Kumar (2006) discuss at length the reasons for 
                                                           
26  Within the ASEAN and in the larger ASBAN + 3 arrangements, there have been periods of significant 
political differences between member countries. These differences for example, between Malaysia and 
Singapore, Thailand and Myanmar, China and Japan, etc. have not been allowed by political leadership 
in East Asia to stall the process of economic cooperation. 
27  Plummer’s ten point blue print includes: (1) Comprehensive coverage of goods within a reasonable 
period of 10 years; (2) Comprehensive coverage of services within a reasonable period; (3) Rules of 
origin should be symmetrical and as low as possible; (4) To the extent possible, customs procedures 
should follow global best practices and WTO consistent protocols; (5) Intellectual Property Rights 
guidelines should be non-discriminatory and consistent with Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) and other international conventions; (6) FDI related provisions should embrace 
national treatment, non-discrimination, shun performance requirements, and have a highly-inclusive 
negative list, as well as provide the usual protection necessary for foreign investors; (7) Anti-dumping 
procedures and dispute resolution need to be transparent and fair, and the process needs to be well 
specified and effective; (8) Government procurement should be open and as non-discriminatory as 
possible, and procedures should be clear and as open as possible; (9) Policies related to competition 
should create a “level playing field” for residents and partners, and they should not put non-partner 
competition at a disadvantage; (10) Technical barriers to trade should be kept to a minimum, with clear 
and transparent mechanisms for determination of standards. India’s Role in South Asia Trade and Investment Integration  |       25 
 
 




(iv) SAARC should adopt ASEAN pragmatism and not let domestic issues interfere 
with the progress of regional cooperation. This stance has facilitated the entry of 
former communist states like, Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and 
Viet Nam, as well as Myanmar (Nesadurai 2006).  
 
(v) Like ASEAN, but at an informal level, a South Asian Finance Ministers’ (FM) 
process has been established with help from the ADB.  This should be formalized 
under the SAARC framework and further strengthened.  This will contribute to a 
better appreciation of existing macroeconomic inter-linkages and initiate some 
coordination of these policies.  
 
(vi) A South Asian Commerce Ministers’ forum could also be established with the aim 
of fostering greater trade integration and ensuring the follow up of decision taken in 
SAARC summits;   
 
(vii) SAARC members could also think of establishing a regional liquidity 
arrangement to guard against any future liquidity crisis, with India taking the lead 
with its large foreign exchange reserves. In this regard, a SAARC+4
29 FMs process, 
similar to ASEAN+3 FMs process, can be established. This will become the starting 
point of an interaction between South Asia and East Asia that will contribute to the 
movement towards an Asian Economic Community. It may be worth mentioning that 
the process of regional integration in South Asia will be facilitated if it is undertaken 
as a part of a broader project of pan-Asian cooperation;  
 
(viii) Finally, it is important to note that ASEAN members did not try to establish 
competing or overlapping regional formations even during times when progress in 
ASEAN was slow. Formations like Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) which 
had a much larger membership and broader objectives were allowed to come up but 
without diluting the commitment to take ASEAN forward. In South Asia, this is not the 
case. Several alternative and overlapping and competing regional formations have 
emerged to which SAARC member countries are often seen to be giving greater 
precedence. BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and 
Economic Cooperation) and the Indian Ocean Rim have very similar membership, 
though in both cases the membership goes beyond South Asia. Moreover, 
Afghanistan is a member of CAREC (Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation) 
and both Afghanistan and Pakistan are members of the ECO (Economic Cooperation 
                                                           
28  Some important measures that India could take in this regard are: (i) reducing its negative list to a 
maximum of 5% of total imports of buy value; (ii) removing specific duties on textile, fabrics and 
readymade garments; (iii) rationalizing tariffs that include domestic central taxes and levies and 
interstate taxes on imports; (iv) reducing transaction costs at the borders; (v) removing ports specific 
entry conditions; and (vi) improving and simplifying regulatory conditions and testing facilities for 
technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosanitary standards. 
29  The “plus 4” here can be the People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea and ASEAN 
which would be represented by the country that may be holding the Chairmanship of ASEAN in that 




Organization) initiative that bring them together with other Central Asian republics. 
There is also the SASEC (South Asia Sub-regional Economic Cooperation). Two of 
these formations, BIMSTEC and SASEC were established quite clearly to 
circumvent the lack any progress in relations between India and Pakistan that held 
back any progress in SAARC projects. The underlying premise for both BIMSTEC 
and SASEC was that regional cooperation among countries without Pakistan will 
make more rapid progress. The results so far do not seem to endorse this 
assumption. But more research needs to be done before the inevitable conclusion is 
reached that it is not merely the state of Indo-Pakistan relations which holds back 
regional cooperation in South Asia.  
 
Our view is that proliferation of regional formations confuses members and dissipates 
the rather limited capacity that these countries have for such regional efforts. It is quite 
clear that very limited if any progress can be made in regional integration in South Asia 
without the two largest economies coming together and recognizing the benefits from 
such cooperation. It is therefore suggested that much greater attention and resources be 
directed by all concerned to making SAARC a success and not trying to bypass the 
issue of the centrality of improving Indo-Pakistan relations in any effort to take regional 
integration forward in South Asia.   
 
 
5.   Prospects and Strategic Direction in South Asian Regional 
Integration  
 
It is clear from the discussion above that initiatives taken so far on expanding trade flows 
within SAARC have not been so successful. Intra-SAARC trade remains a small 
proportion of the region’s total trade. Institutions remain weak and not able to push 
regional integration forward to a level commensurate with potential. Regional 
agreements like SAFTA are beset with problems and have the danger of lagging behind 
ground realities that can change quite rapidly. There is no doubt that some progress was 
made in the last three summits, but it can hardly be argued that this has taken the region 
much further in either building trust-based relationships or putting up institutions or 
structures which have the necessary incentives or motivation to push regional integration 
forward. If, as we have argued above, regional integration in South Asia has the potential 
to generate significant benefits for its member economies, some conditions need to be 
fulfilled and priorities established. We address these issues in this section.  
 
The first condition is for India to further reaffirm its commitment to SAARC and take a far 
more proactive role in ensuring its progress. This stance has to be maintained despite 
the periodic strong provocations that happen in the form of attacks by extremists of 
different hues like the one that occurred in Mumbai in November 2008. There appears to 
be a pattern to these attacks as they are timed to disrupt the progress in bilateral 
relations and in regional cooperation. It is important to repeat this because there is still 
not unanimity in the policy making and policy influencing circles in India on this issue. 
Moreover, any forward movement towards a greater appreciation of the benefits of 
regional cooperation receives a severe setback from random shocks and makes it 
important to reiterate this central message of persisting with efforts for cooperation.  India’s Role in South Asia Trade and Investment Integration  |       27 
 
 
There are several reasons for the lack of unanimity among Indian policy makers on the 
need to promote regional cooperation in South Asia. These are, first, a perception that a 
more regionally integrated space with effectively open borders will exacerbate security 
problems. This sentiment has become stronger in recent years with increasing evidence 
of anti-Indian and extremist elements finding succor and support in some neighboring 
countries. Second, there is also a perception that the region is simply too small for India 
to spend its political and economic negotiating capital, particularly in view of the 
somewhat intransigent stance in some countries, such as Pakistan, which refuse to 
afford India even the WTO-mandated MFN status. Thus, all effort in promoting SAARC 
seems to be wasted. However, India cannot also be seen to support a breakdown of 
SAARC. Thus, the grouping was, until recently, treated as a case of an ‘unavoidable 
sunk cost.’ Third, with the trend toward bilateral agreements that are deeper and broader 
in their coverage now gaining ground, combined with the slow progress of regional 
agreements, there is clear incentive to put more resources in finalizing the bilateral 
agreements. India already has bilateral FTAs with Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. With 
Pakistan in any case not playing the SAFTA game, and Maldives being relatively 
unconnected with South Asia in both geographic and economic terms, there is a case to 
be made for not pushing SAARC and its related agencies and institutions too actively 
and waiting for it to take its own meandering course.   
 
There is no doubt some merit in each of these arguments. But as it has been argued, the 
benefits for India from actively taking the SAARC process forward far outweigh any costs 
or potential negative outcomes.
30 The most compelling reasons for India to take a pro-
active role in support of SAARC are: first, India can hardly expect to play its due role on 
the global stage with a neighborhood that is unstable, insecure and a locus of militant 
and extremist activity. It will be also good for India’s international role to ensure that it is 
seen to lead a regionally integrated and prosperous South Asia where its neighbors pull 
together with it on regional and global issues. Second, some of the most crucial issues, 
such as climate change, HIV/AIDS, migration, hydropower and water management, 
cannot simply be addressed on bilateral terms and have to be tackled regionally. Third, 
India’s lagging regions are concentrated on its borders and are today concentrations of 
poverty and militancy. The situation in these lagging border regions can be changed only 
with regional cooperation. Finally, India’s ethnically diverse, pluralistic, and 
heterogeneous social structure will be better sustained in tandem and collaboration with 
its counterparts across the borders rather than in forced isolation from them. This is true 
of several nationalities that straddle the present borders such as the Kashmiris, 
Punjabis, Sindhis, Tamils, Bengalis, Madhesis, including the Tharus (which are found in 
the Terai region on both sides of the Indo-Nepal border), and several groups which have 
their compatriots across borders in either Bangladesh or Myanmar. For these reasons 
and others that are detailed in Kumar (2008), a successful SAARC emerges to be an 
imperative for India’s own sustainable and inclusive development.   
 
The second necessary condition for pushing forward regional integration in South Asia is 
for India to press ahead and further strengthen its evolving stance of unilateral 
concessions and pro-active pursuit of tangible objectives. A number of working and 
sector groups have been established under the SAARC framework. But there is not 
                                                           




much to show in terms of achievements and successes from these efforts. This can 
change if India decides to pursue a select set of initiatives so that the stated objectives 
and goals are achieved. Thus, for example, the issue of lower tariff rates for 
telecommunication services within the SAARC area has been on the agenda for almost 
a decade, as has been the proposal for establishing direct links among all SAARC 
capitals. There is merit in both these proposals as they will generate positive 
externalities in support of regional integration. India, along with other willing partners, 
that could include observers to SAARC, can decide to pursue these initiatives and also 
bear any financial costs for compensating potential losers. India has to play a similar role 
in South Asian regional integration as was done by Germany in Europe, the US in 
NAFTA and the PRC in the Greater Mekong Subregion and CAREC. As the large and 
dominant partner, it can expect to reap the maximum benefits and so should also be 
prepared to shoulder the efforts and costs of achieving an integrated economic space in 
South Asia.   
 
Third, the SAARC secretariat needs significant reinforcement and professionalization. A 
beginning in this direction is reportedly being made after all these years. This is 
important because a central organization can design new initiatives that follow up others 
that have been started. One of SAARC’s weaknesses is its lack of ‘champions’ for its 
work program. Thus, a number of good ideas and projects remain on the drawing board. 
Ideally of course these champions would come from member country governments. In 
the absence of such a group, however, the SAARC secretariat would have to play this 
role. Therefore, it is important that the senior staff of the secretariat is composed of 
specially selected professionals who have the commitment and motivation to push 
regional integration forward. Their effort is crucial to better appreciation in the region of 
the benefits of regional integration and to identifying the ‘low hanging fruits’ which will 
demonstrate the tangible benefits from regional cooperation.  
 
Fourth, SAARC member countries must agree to focus attention now on improving trade 
facilitation at the borders. As Roy and Banerjee(2008) point out, this is eminently doable 
and yields significant benefits to all concerned. This is reinforced by Wilson and Otsuki 
(2007), who estimate that if South Asia acts collectively to raise capacity in trade 
facilitation, the total estimated gain from capacity building would be about $2.6 billion, a 
60% rise in total formal intra-regional trade in South Asia.   
 
Fifth, the poor state of infrastructure in South Asia is a major constraint on the expansion 
of intra-regional trade flows. It has been estimated that capacity building in information 
technology and services infrastructure, reflected in expanded internet access and use, 
would lead to the greatest gains to intra-regional trade, while capacity building in port (air 
and maritime) efficiency would achieve the second largest trade gains. Not only this, 
unilateral capacity building in the region would increase trade with the rest of the world 
by about $27 billion. This represents about 32% of the region’s trade with the rest of the 
world. Also, 87% of the total gains to South Asia will be generated from South Asia’s own 
moves  to upgrade infrastructure in ports and information technology, harmonize 
regulations, and improve customs. Infrastructure development, within individual 
countries but preferably in projects that improve regional connectivity, will enhance 
prospects for regional cooperation. The continued emphasis on infrastructure 
developments by bilateral and multilateral agencies is therefore welcome.  India’s Role in South Asia Trade and Investment Integration  |       29 
 
 
Sixth, the lack of progress in SAARC can also be attributed to exaggerated perceptions 
of security threats. This has worsened since the 9/11 attacks in the US. This is especially 
relevant for India, which has been the target of extremist activity both by religious 
fundamentalists and other forms of militancy. The immediate and direct consequence of 
this security perception is a rise in mutual mistrust and lack of progress in liberalizing 
cross border movement of people and goods. Given that security is essentially a national 
issue, individual countries will have to determine their own level of comfort. For India, 
which understandably has the highest threat perception and potential, it is perhaps time 
to undertake a thorough review of its security threats that emerge from its neighboring 
countries and present the results to other SAARC members. The neighbors must 
understand that India’s perception of security threats is based on experience and 
intelligence and is real. They would do well to cooperate with India in containing them. It 
is quite clear from recent experience within the region and outside that it is in every 
country’s interest to not encourage, either explicitly or implicitly, any form of militancy and 
extremist behavior. This is like riding a tiger and militancy comes back to haunt even the 
supporter at a later date. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that the SAARC 
Convention on Terrorism is operationalized and given the resources needed for region-
wide steps to give it teeth and a clear mandate.  
 
Seventh, with Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan having recently joined the ranks of 
democratic polities, all SAARC member countries will have democratically elected 
governments. This is an important characteristic for selecting the modalities for pushing 
forward the agenda for regional integration. Progress can hardly be expected to come 
‘top down’ as in the case of a majority of ASEAN member countries. Instead progress, if 
any, will happen if there is popular support for regional integration at the ground level 
and this is communicated effectively to the leadership in each country. In fact recent 
experience perhaps demonstrates that ‘political and executive establishments’ in all 
SAARC member countries are prone to capture by sectional interests and are therefore 
unable to take the bigger view of the benefits of regional cooperation. More worrisome is 
the often heard argument in civil society forums in several capitals in South Asian 
countries that bureaucracies in some may be implicitly opposed to greater regional 
cooperation and intra-regional liberalization because they see it as eroding their power 
and in some cases also their capacity to capture rents. This makes them willing partners 
of the local industry (especially the manufacturing and trading classes) who see intra-
regional liberalization as resulting in an encroachment on their protected economic 
space. Thus, in every SAARC member country there can exist a nexus of interests 
against further progress in regional cooperation. The somewhat tardy progress in 
SAARC can be seen as being due to this nexus, which most often is referred to in the 
literature as ‘lack of political will’ in these countries for regional integration.   
  
This can be changed only by a concerted and coordinated action on part of the other 
stakeholders who either expect to gain from regional integration or those who recognize 
the significant benefits emerging from it. These would include consumers, competitive 
industry, policy think tanks and the media. Major countries external to the region that 
have recently joined as observers in SAARC would support regional integration as the 
most effective means to sustain rapid and inclusive growth, make the region less 
unstable, and reduce the potential for militancy. The multilateral development banks will 




which are in the border areas and to improve the state of regional public goods. Thus, 
the effort should be to bring together a coalition of these stakeholders in support of 
regional integration. In a democratic framework there is no other short cut but to 
establish such a coalition and give the widest publicity to its work and arguments.   
 
The eighth recommendation is to give greater attention to and make more resources 
available to state/provincial governments in India that have borders with other countries. 
These will include some of India’s most advanced states, such as the Punjab and Tamil 
Nadu bordering Pakistan and Sri Lanka respectively, and also some of the least 
developed states like those in the northeast bordering Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal, 
including provinces such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, which border Nepal. Others, such 
as Gujarat and Rajasthan are middle income states which border the Sind and the 
Punjab provinces of Pakistan. There are several reasons for which the border states 
may be more active and effective partners for regional cooperation in South Asia. First, 
in several cases the population in these border states share features with populations 
across borders drawn somewhat arbitrarily and, in some cases, divided populations that 
have a long common history and traditions. Second, in India’s northeast, its landlocked 
nature will be transformed if regional cooperation allowed access to Bangladeshi ports. 
This will also benefit both Bhutan and Nepal because although these countries are 
allowed transit rights through India for goods destined to Bangladesh, the overall 
environment is not conducive to cooperative action. The rapid development of India’s 
northeast and that of Nepal, Bhutan and the northern regions of Bangladesh can be 
facilitated through cross border cooperation between the Indian border states and their 
neighbors.   
 
Finally, it is clear from a review of trade flows and also from extensive interviews of 
industrialists and experts that in South Asia, as also in East and Southeast Asia, greater 
of intra-regional trade volume will most likely follow greater cross-border investment 
flows. This effectively implies that real growth in intra-regional trade can be expected to 
come as intra-industry trade, which all over the world arises from the emergence of 
global or, in this case, regional production networks. This is premised directly upon an 
improvement in the investment climate in individual countries in the region and also as 
discussed above, by addressing infrastructure constraints at the border and for 
improving regional connectivity. Therefore, multilateral development banks and bilateral 
partners from outside the region should further emphasize the need for improving the 
investment climate in individual countries. Successful regional projects will themselves 





This paper has comprehensively reviewed the literature on the potential and prospects of 
regional integration in South Asia. This review, as an examination of the intra-SAARC 
trade and investment flows, also reveals that the progress in regional cooperation has 
been far short of potential. Yet the prospects for greater integration remain intact and 
these are recognized by external observers and also significant sections of people within 
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The paper therefore tries to focus on the ‘real impediments’ to regional integration and 
on that basis makes a set of policy oriented recommendations for furthering regional 
cooperation in South Asia. These nine recommendations, in the previous section are 
directed towards not only the member countries in SAARC but also to the ‘observers’ in 
SAARC and the multilateral development agencies, both of which, in collaboration with 
civil society institutions and think tanks, can make an effective contribution to taking the 
process forward.  
 
The three central arguments in the paper, as mentioned at the beginning, are: first, 
increased intra-regional trade will follow higher flows of cross-border investment and so 
greater effort should be directed to achieve the latter. Second, as the dominant partner in 
SAARC, India will have to accept disproportionately greater responsibilities in pushing 
forward the SAARC process. This will include a continuation and strengthening of the 
process of unilateral concessions that India has recently initiated in a clear admission 
that it will not demand reciprocity from its neighbors. However, we also argue that India’s 
unilateral approach cannot be continued indefinitely and its neighbors, particularly 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, will have to show some minimal progress in changing their 
current positions, which cannot be justified either on the basis of international 
agreements or bilateral benefits that visibly accrue from regional cooperation. Third, 
given the widespread support for regional cooperation in the civil society, academics, 
and sections of industry in each member country in SAARC, this is an opportune time for 
putting together a concerted and coordinated effort to overcome the remaining 
impediments to regional integration. Such an effort will surely take the process beyond 
the tipping point. The benefits that are subsequently generated will ensure that the 
virtuous cycle of increasing levels of regional cooperation in South Asia is then set in 
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Intra-regional Exports and Imports 
Bangladesh  
SITC   Exports     SITC   Imports  
26   Textile fibres     65   Textile yarn/fabric/art  
52   Inorganic chemicals     04   Cereals/cereal preparatn  
65   Textile yarn/fabric/art     26   Textile fibres  
07   Coffee/tea/cocoa/spices     78   Road vehicles  
56   Manufactured fertilizers     67   Iron and steel  
 




SITC   Exports     SITC   Imports  
33   Petroleum and products     65   Textile yarn/fabric/art  
65   Textile yarn/fabric/art     68   Non-ferrous metals  
06   Sugar/sugar prep/honey     33   Petroleum and products  
78   Road vehicles     05   Vegetables and fruit  
51   Organic chemicals     43   Animal/vegetable oils processed  
 
Source: Estimated from WITS Data Notes: Data is for 2006.  
 
Maldives   
SITC   Exports     SITC   Imports  
03   Fish/shellfish/etc.     27   Crude fertilizer/mineral  
08   Animal feed excluding unmilled 
cereal  
  05   Vegetables and fruit  
28   Metal ores/metal scrap     04   Cereals/cereal preparation  
41   Animal oil/fat     89   Misc manufactures 
57   Plastics in primary form     66   Non-metal mineral manufacture  
 




SITC   Exports     SITC   Imports  
65   Textile yarn/fabric/art     33   Petroleum and products  
43   Animal/veg oils processed     67   Iron and steel  
55   Perfume/cosmetic/cleanser     65   Textile yarn/fabric/articles 
67   Iron and steel     66   Non-metal mineral manufacture  
84   Apparel/clothing/access     78   Road vehicles  
 




SITC   Exports     SITC   Imports  
33   Petroleum and products     06   Sugar/sugar prep/honey  
65   Textile yarn/fabric/art     51   Organic chemicals  
04   Cereals/cereal preparation     26   Textile fibres  
43   Animal/vegetable oils processed     08   Animal feed ex unml cer.  
66   Non-metal mineral manufacture    57   Plastics in primary form  
 
Source: Estimated from WITS Data Notes: Data is for 2006.  
 
 
Sri Lanka  
SITC   Exports     SITC   Imports  
68   Non-ferrous metals     78   Road vehicles  
43   Animal/vegetable oils processed     33   Petroleum and products  
07   Coffee/tea/cocoa/spices     65   Textile yarn/fabric/art  
77   Electrical equipment     67   Iron and steel  
69   Metal manufactures nes     68   Non-ferrous metals  
 





FDI Inflow by Sectors 
 ($ Million)  
India   2004  2005  2006 
Cement and Gypsum Products    0   452   243  
Chemicals    198   447   206  
Construction    152   151   985  
Drugs and Pharmaceuticals    292   172   215  
Electrical Equipment    721   1,451   2,733  
Fuel    166   94   250  
Food Processing   38   42   98  
Services Sector   469   581   4,749  
Telecommunications    129   680   521  
Transportation    179   222   466  
 
Source: South Asia Economic Report: FDI in South Asia. ADB, December 2007.  
 
($ Million)  
Pakistan  2005  2006  2007 
Communications    518   1,938   1,899  
Financial Business    269   329   930  
Oil and Gas Explorations    194   313   545  
Tobacco and Cigarettes    7   3   390  
Power    73   321   205  
Trade    52   118   173  
Construction    43   90   157  
Petroleum Refining   24   31   155  
Beverages    6   6   89  
Personal Services    24   62   84  
 
Source: South Asia Economic Report: FDI in South Asia. ADB, December 2007.  India’s Role in South Asia Trade and Investment Integration  |       39 
 
 
($ Million)  
Bangladesh  2004  2005  2006 
Transport Storage & Comm.   127.5  279.9   347 
Telecommunication    127.5  278.8   346.5 
Power, Gas & Petroleum    124  208.3   208.2 
Gas & Petroleum    93.7  181.1   187.2 
Trade & Commerce    66.6  130.5   130.2 
Banking    n.a.  117.8   117.7 
Manufacturing   139.4  219.3   104.9 
Textile & Wearing    37.7  96.5   70.1 
Power    30.3  27.2   21.2 
Cement    59.3  45.3   2.6 
Agriculture & Fishing    1.7  1.7   1.3 
Services   1.1  3   0.2 
 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Enterprise Survey, 2006 and 2007.  
 
($ Million)  
Sri Lanka   2003  2004  2005   2006 
1. Food Beverages & Tobacco    10.39 23.01 29.38    34.1 
2. Textile, Wearing Apparel & Leather    22.1  26.82  47.28   103.48 
3. Wood & Wood Products    6.35 0.35 0.92    4.39 
4. Paper & Paper Prod., Printing & Publishing    0.79 0.09 8.16    0.76 
5. Chemicals, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber & Plastics   14.8  8.85  20.14   43.15 
6. Non-Metallic Mineral Products    8.63  51.74  5.9   5.27 
7. Fabricated Metal, Machinery & Transport    10.51  3.6  15.34   14.08 
8. Manufactured Products (N.E.S.)    6.89 8.14 8.22    29.54 
9. Agriculture    - -  0.47   0.67 
10. Services/ Infrastructure   130.14  111.68  151.41   368.24 
 













Approved FDI Projects by Sub-sector (As of April 2007)  
(in Rupees Million)  
Nepal    No. of Projects  Total Project Cost  Foreign Investment 
Manufacturing   522   39,513.60   13,815.30  
Tourism    304   16,299.60   4,874.10  
Service   331   18,323.20   9,104.60  
Agro-based    15   440.1   101.8  
Energy-based   19   19,814.30   3,432.50  
Construction    23   1,186.90   691  
Mineral   4   1,163.10   56  
Total    1218   96,741.10   32,075.30  
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In this paper, Rajiv Kumar and Manjeeta Singh find that while the level of regional 
integration in the South Asian countries is low, recent developments have improved the 
prospects for greater integration in the region. This provides the basis for another sustained 
effort at promoting regional economic cooperation in which India, with its dominant 
position, will have to adopt asymmetrical responsibilities. But other governments will 
also have to respond positively for successful regional integration in South Asia. I
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